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Abstract 
 
Changes in monetary policy have surprisingly strong effects on forward real rates in the distant 
future. A 100 basis-point increase in the 2-year nominal yield on an FOMC announcement day is 
associated with a 42 basis-point increase in the 10-year forward real rate. This finding is at odds 
with standard macro models based on sticky nominal prices, which imply that monetary policy 
cannot move real rates over a horizon longer than that over which all prices in the economy can 
readjust. Rather, the responsiveness of long-term real rates to monetary shocks appears to reflect 
changes in term premia. One mechanism that may generate such variation in term premia is 
based on demand effects coming from “yield-oriented” investors. We find some evidence 
supportive of this channel. 
 
                                                 
* We thank John Campbell, Gene Fama, Emmanuel Farhi, Robin Greenwood, Anil Kashyap, David Scharfstein, 
Larry Summers, Adi Sunderam, Paul Tucker, Luis Viceira, and seminar participants at Harvard University for 
helpful comments.  The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence 
by other members of the Board of Governors. 1 
 
I.  Introduction 
  In this paper, we document that changes in the stance of monetary policy have 
surprisingly strong effects on very distant forward real interest rates. Concretely, we show that a 
100 basis-point (bp) increase in the 2-year nominal yield on a Federal Open Markets Committee 
(FOMC) announcement day—which we use as a proxy for changes in expectations regarding the 
path of the federal funds rate over the following several quarters—is associated with a 42 bp 
increase in the 10-year forward overnight real rate, extracted from the yield curve for Treasury 
Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). 
Our findings can be illustrated with the FOMC’s much-discussed announcement on 
January 25, 2012. On that date the FOMC significantly changed its forward guidance, indicating 
that it expected to hold the federal funds rate near zero “through late 2014” whereas it had 
previously only stated that it expected to do so “through mid-2013.”
1 In response to this 
announcement, the expected path of short-term nominal rates fell significantly from two to five 
years out, with the 2-year nominal yield dropping by 5 bps and the 5-year nominal yield by 14 
bps. More strikingly, 10-year and 20-year real forward rates declined by 5 bps and 9 bps 
respectively. In other words, distant real forward rates appeared to react strongly to news about 
the future stance of monetary policy. 
  This finding is at odds with standard New-Keynesian macro models, in which the central 
bank’s ability to influence real variables stems from that fact that goods prices are sticky in 
nominal terms. In such models, a change in monetary policy should have no impact on forward 
real interest rates at a horizon longer than that over which all nominal prices can readjust, and it 
seems implausible to think that this horizon could be anything close to ten years.
2 
                                                 
1 Specifically, the FOMC replaced a key sentence in the December 13, 2011 statement—that it anticipated that 
economic conditions “are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-
2013”—with “are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.” 
 
2 See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) for an introduction to the New-Keynesian literature and Gali (2008) for a 
more detailed treatment. 2 
 
  So how does one make sense of our finding? One possibility is that the results are simply 
wrong in some sense—i.e., they are either not robust or non-causal. On the robustness front, one 
limitation of our analysis is that there is a relatively brief sample period in the US over which we 
can study real rates—TIPS were introduced in 1997 and reliable data only become available in 
1999. In an effort to address this concern, we replicate our analysis on UK data over this same 
period and find broadly similar results. 
With respect to causality, a worry is that movements in short-term nominal rates on 
FOMC announcement days may not reflect innovations to Fed policy per se, but rather just the 
response of the Fed to information about the future evolution of the economy. For example, 
suppose there is news suggesting a permanent positive productivity shock. It is possible that this 
shock both raises the natural (flexible-price) real interest rate in the economy forever, and at the 
same time leads the Fed to tighten in the short run. If so, it would be a mistake to conclude that 
the increase in distant forward real rates was caused by an autonomous change in Fed policy. 
Although it is difficult to completely rule out this possibility, we can make some progress 
by comparing the results we get for FOMC announcement days to the analogous results for non-
FOMC days. The idea is that non-FOMC days also have their fair share of macro news, but are 
less likely to be informative about shifts in the Fed’s reaction function. Thus, if the elasticity of 
long-term real rates to short-term nominal rates is driven by macro news, this elasticity should be 
stronger on non-FOMC days, which arguably have a greater relative proportion of macro news 
and less reaction-function news. However, this prediction is not borne out in the data. If 
anything, we find the reverse: distant forward real rates react more strongly to changes in short-
term nominal rates on FOMC days than on non-FOMC days. Although not a definitive test, this 
provides some support for thinking about the FOMC-announcement-day results as reflecting the 
causal consequences of changes in the stance of monetary policy. 
Assuming that the results can be given a causal interpretation, what economic mechanism 
do they reflect? It is helpful to begin by noting that a movement in the 10-year forward real rate 3 
 
can always be decomposed into a change in the expected real rate that will prevail in 10 years, 
plus a change in the 10-year real term premium. A movement in the real term premium is 
equivalent to saying that when the Fed raises short-term nominal rates, this increases the 
expected return on a carry-trade strategy that borrows short-term and buys long-term real bonds.
3 
This decomposition suggests two broad economic channels that could be at work. The 
first involves monetary policy somehow moving expected future real rates at very distant 
horizons. If this channel were operative, it would be a form of long-run monetary non-neutrality 
that runs directly counter to the rational-expectations spirit of New-Keynesian models. In other 
words, it is hard to see how this channel could be squared with the bedrock assumption in these 
models, namely that nominal prices are set in a rational, forward-looking manner. 
The alternative possibility is that monetary policy does not move expected future real 
rates far out into the future, but rather that it changes the term premia on long-term bonds. This 
implies that the effects on forward rates that we document should be expected to mean revert 
over time. To test this hypothesis, we proceed as follows. At any point in time t, we cumulate the 
changes in long-term forward rates that occurred solely on FOMC announcement days over the 
preceding three months. We then use these FOMC-announcement-day changes to forecast 
changes in forward rates over the subsequent twelve months. It turns out that when long-term 
forward rates rise on an FOMC announcement day, this portends a reversal of forward rates over 
the next twelve months. The evidence is thus consistent with the proposition that monetary 
policy shocks induce time-variation in real term premia.
4 
This then raises the question of why monetary policy might be influencing real term 
premia. In traditional representative-agent asset pricing models, term premia are pinned down by 
                                                 
3 For those more comfortable thinking in terms of stock prices: when a company’s stock price goes up, one can 
always decompose this into news about either its expected future earnings (the analog to news about the expected 
future real rate here) or about its discount rate (the analog to the term premium on a carry-trade strategy). 
 
4 To be clear, none of our evidence directly refutes the long-run non-neutrality hypothesis, namely that monetary 
policy is somehow able to move expected real rates far out into future. It is quite possible that both effects are 
simultaneously at work. 4 
 
the covariance between real bond returns and investors’ marginal utility. It is difficult to see why 
monetary shocks would change this covariance in the required direction, so we focus instead on 
an alternative class of supply-and-demand-based mechanisms. One specific explanation that we 
flesh out in detail has to do with a set of “yield-oriented” investors. We assume that these 
investors allocate their portfolios between short and long-term bonds, and in doing so, put some 
weight in their objective functions not just on expected holding-period returns, but also on 
current income or yield. This could be because of agency or accounting considerations that lead 
them to care about short-term measures of reported performance. 
A reduction in short-term nominal rates leads these investors to rebalance their portfolios 
towards longer-term bonds, in an effort to keep their overall portfolio yield from declining too 
much. This in turn creates buying pressure that raises the price of the long-term bonds, and hence 
lowers long-term real yields and forward rates. Note that this price pressure is independent of 
expectations about the actual path of future short rates—it is a pure term-premium effect. And 
interestingly, according to this hypothesis, conventional monetary policy moves long-term real 
rates in much the same way as some of the Fed’s recent unconventional policy measures, such as 
its quantitative-easing purchases of long-term Treasuries. These too are presumed to operate 
through a supply-and-demand effect on term premia as opposed to by changing expectations 
about the future path of rates. 
We go on to provide some evidence that is consistent with our hypothesis about the role 
of yield-oriented investors. We do so by looking at the maturity of securities held by commercial 
banks. Banks fit with our conception of yield-oriented investors to the extent that they care about 
their reported earnings—which, given bank accounting rules, are based on current income from 
securities holdings and not mark-to-market changes in value. And indeed, we find that when the 
yield curve steepens, banks increase the maturity of their securities holdings. Moreover, the 
magnitudes of these portfolio shifts are large in the aggregate, so that if they had to be absorbed 
by other, less yield-oriented investors (e.g., broker-dealers or hedge funds) they could plausibly 5 
 
drive changes in market-wide term premia. We also find that primary dealers in the Treasury 
market—who, unlike banks, must mark their securities holdings to market—take the other side 
of the trade, reducing the maturity of their Treasury holdings when the yield curve steepens. 
The ideas in this paper connect to several strands of prior research. There is a large 
literature which examines the impact of monetary policy surprises on long-term nominal interest 
rates. For example, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002) find that a 100 bp increase in the one-month 
Eurodollar rate around the time of a fed-funds target change is associated with a 52 bp increase 
in 10-year nominal Treasury yields. They too cast this as something of a puzzle, remarking that: 
“the size of the coefficients is particularly startling” (page 92). In a similar vein, Gürkaynak, 
Sack, and Swanson (2005a) show that distant nominal forward rates respond strongly to a variety 
of macroeconomic news releases, including FOMC announcements.
5 
We sharpen the puzzle by focusing on real forward rates instead of nominal yields or 
nominal forward rates, which puts the long-run non-neutrality issue front-and-center. By 
contrast, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a) argue that their results are consistent with a 
model in which long-run inflation expectations are not well anchored and are revised in light of 
incoming news. According to this explanation, monetary shocks might alter long-run inflation 
expectations, but would have no impact on long-run real rates. 
The yield-oriented investors that drive term premia in our model are reminiscent of 
Rajan’s (2005) account of investor behavior in a low-interest-rate environment. And the idea that 
supply-and-demand effects can have important consequences in the Treasury market is central to 
a number of recent papers, including Gagnon et al (2010), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010a, 
2010b), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011, 2012), and Vayanos and Vila (2009). An 
important antecedent to this work is Modigliani and Sutch (1966).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we document the strong 
sensitivity of long-term real forward rates to monetary policy news, and argue that this 
                                                 
5 Other papers in this tradition include Cook and Hahn (1989), Evans and Marshall (1998), and Kuttner (2001). 6 
 
relationship is likely to be causal. In Section III, we make the case that movements in long-term 
forward rates around monetary policy announcements reflect changes in term premia. In Section 
IV, we investigate the mechanism behind these changing term premia. Section V concludes. 
 
II.  The Sensitivity of Long-Term Real Forward Rates to Monetary Policy News 
A.  Measuring Monetary Policy News 
To get started, we need a measure of monetary policy news. There is a growing 
consensus that changes in the policy outlook are the primary form of monetary policy news on 
FOMC announcement days. Thus, building on Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b) and 
Campell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012), our measurement strategy is based on the premise 
that, at least since 1994, a significant portion of the news contained in FOMC announcements is 
about the expected path of the federal funds rates over the next several quarters, as opposed to 
surprise changes in the current funds rate.
6 
In order to capture revisions to the full expected path of the funds rate over the coming 
quarters in a simple and transparent manner, we use the change in the 2-year nominal Treasury 
yield on FOMC announcement dates as our proxy for monetary policy news. However, as 
described in our robustness tests below, we obtain similar results with a variety of related 
variables that capture revisions in expected short rates over the following several quarters. The 
key is that these variables capture news about the expected medium-term path of interest rates—
as opposed to only news about rates over the coming month or two. 
In our baseline specification, for an FOMC meeting on day t, we compute changes from 
t–1 to t+1 in order to capture the full market response to the announcement. We focus on 2-day 
changes because Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b) present intra-day evidence which 
                                                 
6 In 1994, the FOMC began issuing a press release with the current federal funds target after every meeting and also 
began releasing announcements discussing the economic and policy outlook. Prior to 1994, the FOMC implicitly 
announced the change in its target via the size and type of the next open market operation following a policy change 
(typically the day after the FOMC meeting). From 1994 to mid-1999 the FOMC only released a statement when it 
changed the policy target. However, since mid-1999, the FOMC has released a statement following each meeting. 7 
 
suggests that the market takes time to process the information contained in FOMC statements 
about the likely path of the funds rate. Moreover, one might expect a slightly more gradual 
adjustment process to the extent that some of the reaction of long-term rates is quantity-
mediated—i.e., involves portfolio rebalancing by some investors—as opposed to reflecting a 
pure shift in the expectations of all investors. Nevertheless, our results our qualitatively similar, 
albeit somewhat smaller in magnitude, if we instead measure changes over the 1-day interval 
from day t–1 to t. 
We use data from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007, 2010) on the nominal Treasury 
yield curve and the real (TIPS) Treasury yield curve as updated regularly by the Federal Reserve 
Board. Each day they estimate the 6-parameter model of the instantaneous forward curve 
proposed by Svensson (1994). Zero coupon yields are then obtained by integrating along the 
estimated forward curve 
() 1 ( )
0 .
n nm
tt y nf d m
    (1) 
The parameters are estimated each day by minimizing a weighted sum of pricing errors. 
Estimates of the nominal yield curve are based on a sample of nominal Treasuries that includes 
almost all off-the-run notes and bonds with more than three months to maturity. Estimates of the 
real yield curve are based on all TIPS with a remaining maturity longer than 18 months.
7 
  We can decompose the n-year nominal forward rate 
$( ) n
t f  into the sum of the forward 
real rate 
() TIPS n
t f and the forward break-even inflation rate 
() n
t f
 , 
$( ) ( ) ( ).
nT I P S n n
tt t ff f
   (2) 
The n-year nominal zero-coupon yield can be decomposed analogously 
$( ) ( ) ( ).
nT I P S n n
tt t yy y
   (3) 
 
                                                 
7 Treasuries with less than 3 months remaining to maturity, T-bills, and on-the-run notes and bonds are omitted from 
the nominal sample because they often embed liquidity or convenience premia relative to other Treasuries. Short-
term TIPS are omitted because lags in inflation indexation make the behavior of their yields somewhat erratic. 8 
 
B.  Baseline Results for the US 
In our baseline specifications, we regress changes in forward nominal rates, forward real 
rates, and forward break-even inflation rates on changes in 2-year nominal yields 
$( ) $(2) $( )
$$     () ()
nn
tt t fa n b n y         (4a) 
() $ ( 2 ) () () ()
TIPS n TIPS n
tt t TIPS TIPS fa n b n y        (4b) 
() $ ( 2 ) ()     () () .
nn
tt t fa n b n y

         (4c) 
We focus on FOMC announcement dates from 1999-present. However, we exclude five FOMC 
announcement dates that contained significant news about the Fed’s Large Scale Asset Purchases 
(sometimes referred to as “QE1”, “QE2” and “Operation Twist”).
8 We do so because the 
mechanism underlying long-term rate movements on these dates is potentially different from that 
driving market reactions to more conventional FOMC announcements. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 present the basic results. Panel A of Figure 1 shows how the 
nominal forward curve responds to a 100 basis-point shock to short-term nominal rates. 
Specifically, Figure 1A plots the coefficients from regression (4a) for maturities n = 5, …, 20 
along with 95% confidence intervals. Panel B of Figure 1 decomposes the response of nominal 
forwards into a change in real forwards and forward breakeven inflation, plotting the coefficients 
from regressions (4b) and (4c). By construction, the sum of the two coefficients shown in Panel 
B equals the coefficient in Panel A. Table 1 lists all the regression coefficients. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show that distant nominal forwards respond significantly to changes 
in short-term nominal rates on FOMC days. And, surprisingly, this response is driven almost 
exclusively by movements in real forwards. A 100 bps shock to the 2-year nominal rate on an 
FOMC announcement date is associated with a 45 bps increase in 10-year nominal forwards  
                                                 
8 The five FOMC announcement dates that we exclude are 3/18/09 (QE1: increased size of the LSAP from $600 
billion to $1.75 trillion); 10/10/2010 (QE2: FOMC Will reinvest coupon/principal from LSAP to maintain constant 
portfolio); 9/21/2010 (QE2: FOMC maintains its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments); 11/03/2010 
(QE2: Will purchase additional $600B of USTs); and 9/21/2011 (Operation Twist: Fed announces the Maturity 
Extension program, a plan to sell $400 billion of short-term USTs and buy $400 billion of long-term USTs by June 
2012). Our results are robust both to including these dates, as well as to excluding a couple of others (12/16/2008 
and 01/28/2009) that arguably also contained some information about the LSAPs. 9 
 
(t = 3.54). And this 45 bps increase can be decomposed into a 42 bps rise in real forwards  
(t = 4.63) and a 3 bps rise in forward break-even inflation (t = 0.23). This pattern holds even as 
we consider more distant forwards. A 100 bps shock to 2-year nominal rates is associated with 
an 18 bps increase in 20-year nominal forwards (t = 1.32), which reflects a 30 bps rise in real 
forwards (t = 3.15) and a 12 bps decline in forward break-evens (t = -0.79). 
Table 2 conducts a variety of robustness exercises. First, we vary the event window. In 
our baseline results, we use a 2-day window from day t-1 to day t+1. In Table 2, we report 
comparable results where we use a 1-day window from t–1 to t. As noted above, our results are 
somewhat smaller in magnitude with the 2-day window. Next we try a using a variety of 
alternative measures of short-run nominal rates in place of 2-year Treasury yields. These include: 
1-year Treasury yields; the overnight index swap (OIS) linked to the federal funds rate; fed funds 
futures; and Eurodollar futures contracts. The basic take-away is that everything works similarly 
with any variable that captures news about the medium-term path of rates, as opposed to one that 
only captures what the target will be in the next few weeks. This is shown explicitly where 
construct the “future path of policy” news factor as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b). 
Finally, we vary the sample. For example, we add QE dates or the dates on which FOMC 
minutes are released. This has little impact on the results. 
C.   Parallel Results for the UK 
To further investigate the robustness of our results, we run the analogous set of 
regressions using UK data. To do so, we rely on the yield curve estimates published by the Bank 
of England (BOE) which employ the spline-based techniques described in Andersen and Sleath 
(2001). As above, we estimate regressions (4a), (4b), and (4c) on all dates when the BOE’s 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has met since 1999.
9 Our proxy for news on MPC dates is 
                                                 
9 Although the UK has issued inflation-linked bonds since 1985, we focus on the more recent period since their 
monetary regime changed significantly in June 1997 when the Bank of England was granted formal independence 
from the UK Treasury. We begin in 1999 in order to maintain comparability with our results for the US. However, 
the UK results are unchanged if we consider all MPC announcements from June 1997 to present. 
 10 
 
the change in the 2-year nominal yield. And, as above, we compute changes from t-1 to t+1 for 
meetings on day t. And we drop six MPC dates from 2009 to 2011 when there was significant 
news about the BOE’s quantitative easing operations.
10 
Table 3 and Figure 2 present the basic results for the UK. The estimates are generally 
similar to those from the US, although the magnitude of the effect is slightly smaller in the UK 
In particular, for the 10-year forward real rate, the coefficient on the two-year nominal yield is 
0.291 in the UK as compared to 0.421 in the US. 
D.   Do Monetary Shocks Cause the Movements in Distant Real Forward Rates? 
In spite of our focus on FOMC announcement days, it could be argued that the above 
results may not reflect a causal impact of monetary policy innovations on long-term real rates. 
Rather, it could be that the Fed’s policy announcement is simply a response to its private 
information about the future evolution of the economy, and it is the release of the Fed’s private 
information—as opposed to news about its reaction function—that moves long-term real rates. 
For example, suppose the Fed has private information to the effect that the economy’s 
long-run growth potential is weaker than previously believed. This might cause the Fed to ease 
policy, reducing the expected path of nominal rates over the next several quarters. And once 
disclosed, the same information might also lead investors to expect the long-run natural real rate 
to decline. However, the movement in long-term real rates would not be a causal consequence of 
monetary policy in this case, as it would have happened even had the Fed chosen not to ease. 
This reverse-causality story is already somewhat suspect on an a priori basis, because it 
presumes that the Fed has material private information about the very long-run evolution of the 
                                                 
10 The list is based on Table A in Joyce, Tong, and Woods (2011). The dates are 03/05/2009 (decision to purchase 
£75B Gilts), 05/07/2009 (decision to purchase an additional £50B Gilts), 08/06/2009 (decision to purchase an 
additional £50B Gilts), 11/05/2009 (decision to purchase an additional £25B Gilts), 02/04/2010 (total asset 
purchases will be maintained at £200B), and 10/06/2011 (decision to purchase an additional £75B Gilts). 11 
 
economy. And a variety of studies have shown that the Fed does not have any forecasting 
advantage relative to private analysts more than a few quarters into the future.
11 
Nevertheless, we take a crude stab at testing the reverse-causality hypothesis. To do so, 
we compare our results above to those on all non-FOMC-announcement days. The intuition for 
this experiment is as follows. Non-FOMC days see the release of a variety of fundamental macro 
news items—the same kind of macro news that the Fed is ostensibly revealing with its FOMC 
announcements in the private-information story—but are less likely to bring news about the 
Fed’s reaction function. Thus if the elasticity of long-term real rates to short-term nominal rates 
is simply driven by macro news, as is posited in reverse-causality hypothesis, this elasticity 
should be stronger on non-FOMC days, which arguably have a greater relative proportion of 
macro news as compared to reaction-function news. 
To implement the test, we estimate 
$(2) $(2) () () ,
tt
TIPS n TIPS n
tt t t yy fa bc F O M C dF O M C             (5) 
for n = 5, 10, and 20 using all days in the sample. The results are displayed in Table 4. The key 
coefficient of interest is that on the interaction term, d, which captures how the elasticity of long-
term real forward rates to short-term nominal rates on FOMC days differs from that on non-
FOMC days. According to the reverse-causality hypothesis, we would expect this coefficient to 
be negative. In fact, it is generally positive, although only marginally significant. The point 
estimates for 10-year real forwards suggest that the elasticity on non-FOMC days is 0.268, as 
compared to a value of 0.421 on FOMC days. 
  Thus the results in Table 4 fail to support the reverse-causality hypothesis.
12 Of course, 
this is not the same thing as having a clean instrument for exogenous shocks to the Fed’s reaction 
                                                 
11 Romer and Romer (2000) argue that Fed inflation forecasts for the coming quarters outperformed those of private 
forecasters from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. By contrast, Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) argue that 
FOMC policy surprises contain little information that could be used to improve macroeconomic forecasts and that 
private forecasters do not appear to revise their forecasts in response to policy surprises. Regardless, there is no 
argument in the literature that the Fed has a significant forecasting advantage at anything close to a 10-year horizon. 
 12 
 
function. So while we believe the balance of the evidence favors a causal interpretation of the 
role of monetary policy on long-term real forwards, the identification is admittedly not airtight. 
 
III.  Changes in Expected Future Rates vs. Changes in Term Premia 
If one accepts the premise that monetary policy does indeed have an important causal 
impact on long-term real forward rates, the natural next question to ask is whether this reflects 
changes in expected future real rates or changes in term premia. If it is the former, this would 
represent a direct challenge to the notion that monetary policy is neutral in the long run, since the 
implication would be that a change in policy today has a large effect on the expected level of the 
real rate 10 years or more into the future. If it is the latter, this opens the door to a novel 
monetary transmission channel. And one would then want to understand the strength and 
persistence of this term premium effect, as well as the economic mechanisms that give rise to it. 
A.  Forecasting Regressions 
As a matter of bond accounting, a change in the n-year forward real rate can always be 
decomposed into a change in the expected real rate that will prevail in n–1 years, plus a change 
in the n-year real term premium.
13 Letting 
() n
t f  be the n-year forward rate at time t, 
()
1
n
t r  the 
realized return on an n-period zero-coupon bond from t to t+1, and 
(1)
t y  the yield on a one-period 
bond at time t (i.e., the short rate), it is straightforward to show that, for changes in distant 
forward rates over a short horizon, we have 
News about future term premia News about future short rates
1 () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( )
1 1 [] [( ) ] .
n nn j n j
tt t t j t j tn j fE y E r r
  
       
  
 (6) 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 In untabulated regressions, we have redone the exercise in Table 4 with the UK data. The results are qualitatively 
similar. In particular, the elasticity of long-term real forward rates to short-term nominal rates is slightly higher on 
BOE announcement days than on non-announcement days, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
 
13We work with 1-year forward rates in this section as opposed to the instantaneous forward rates used above. We 
do this to exploit the simple decompositions for 1-year forward rates, but this choice only has a trivial impact on the 
estimates. Note too that equation (6) is strictly true only over short intervals where expected excess returns are near 
zero. More generally, only unexpected changes in forwards—equivalently, unexpected bond returns—contain news. 13 
 
In other words, unexpected changes in long-dated forward rates must either reflect (i) news about 
expected short rates in the distant future or (ii) news about future term premia. This is similar to 
Campbell’s (1991) observation that unexpected stock returns must either be due to cash-flow 
news or discount-rate news. 
To test whether movements in distant forward rates reflect news about future short rates 
or news about future term premia, we run regressions in which we use 3-month changes in the 
forward rate, 
() ()
1/4
nn
tt f f   , to forecast subsequent changes in forward rates over a 12-month 
horizon, 
(1 ) ( )
1
nn
tt f f

  . Since 
(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
11 1 ()
nn n n
tt t t ff r r

    , this is directly equivalent to a test of 
equation (6). That is, if movements in forward rates were only informative about future short 
rates, and not about excess bond returns, there would be no predictable mean reversion in 
forward rates. Conversely, if we do find evidence of mean reversion in forward rates, this maps 
into a particular trading strategy that earns excess returns. For example, if the 10-year forward 
rate jumps up today and is expected to fall back over the next year, this is the same as saying that 
10-year bonds are expected to outperform 9-year bonds over the next year. 
We face an important data limitation in this forecasting exercise. Ideally, we would like 
to do everything in real terms, since our focus thus far has been on real rates. However, given the 
short span of the TIPS data and the fact that we are we are working with 12-month returns, this 
leaves us with only dozen fully independent observations.  So we worry about relying solely on 
TIPS forecasting regressions from 1999-2011. 
Instead we first focus on the nominal data, which allow us to consider a longer sample. 
We restrict attention to the 1987-present (post-Volcker) period in which inflation expectations 
have been relatively well-anchored in the US. It seems plausible to use the nominal data as a 
proxy for the missing real data over this period. In particular, our key independent variable is the 
change in the 10-year forward rate on FOMC announcement days. For the post-1999 period for 
which we have data on both, the correlation between the real and the nominal versions of this 
variable is 0.77. And the correlation between the nominal and real versions of our dependent 14 
 
variable—the change in forwards over 12-month intervals—is 0.82. This suggests that using 
nominal data in place of real data to extend the sample is a reasonable way to proceed. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents these forecasting results. In column (1), we begin by 
estimating the following univariate regression 
$(9) $(10) $(10) $(10) $(10)
11 / 4 1 () . tt t t t ff a b f f         (7) 
That is, we use the change in the 10-year nominal forward rate over the prior quarter to predict 
the change in forward rates over the following 12 months.
14 Again, as a benchmark, one would 
expect  b = 0 under the log expectations hypothesis. (Since 
$(10) $(9)
1 [] tt t fE f    under the 
expectations hypothesis, it should be impossible to forecast 
$(9) $(10) $(9) $(9)
11 1 [] tt t t t ff fE f     ). We 
obtain b = –0.343 (t = –3.21), implying that a 100 bps rise in the nominal forward rate in a given 
quarter is associated with a 34 bps decline over the following 12 months. 
  In column (2) we present instrumental variables (IV) estimates of equation (7) using 
$(2) $(2)
1/4 tt yy    as an instrument for 
$(10) $(10)
1/4 tt ff   . These IV estimates enable us to examine the 
reversion following movements in forward rates that are themselves a response to changes in 
short rates. The large IV estimates suggest that the response of forwards to changes in short rates 
is quickly reverted away. Indeed the IV estimate of b = –1.078 (t = –2.13) implies that the initial 
response is completely reversed within 12 months. Thus, the IV estimates are consistent with the 
idea that the response of distant forwards to short rates primarily reflects movements in term 
premia as opposed to changes in expected short rates. 
Columns (3) and (4) show that similar results hold when we control for the forward rate 
spread 
$(10) $(1)
tt f y  —i.e., the difference between the 10-year forward rate and the short rate—as 
in Fama and Bliss (1987). Our results also hold up if we control for other bond forecasting 
                                                 
14 The regressions are estimated with monthly data, so each month we are forecasting the excess return over the 
following 12 months. To deal with the overlapping nature of returns, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. 15 
 
variables, including the term spread as in Campbell and Shiller (1989) or linear combinations of 
forward rates as in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Cieslak and Pavlova (2011).  
In column (5) we break the change in the 10-year forward rate into the component that 
occurs on FOMC days and the component that occurs on other non-FOMC days, and use these 
separately as predictive variables 
$(10) $(9) $(10) $(10) $(10) $(10) $(10)
11 / 4 1 / 4 1 () () . tt tt F O M Ctt N O N F O M C t ff a b ff c ff             (8) 
This approach is more tightly connected to our earlier findings, as it allows us to focus on those 
changes in forward rates that are associated with monetary-policy announcements. The cost is 
that it sacrifices considerable statistical power, given the small number of FOMC days. 
As shown in column (5), the coefficient on the FOMC-days part of the forward rate 
change (b = –0.564, with a t-statistic of –1.69) is somewhat larger than its counterpart for non-
FOMC days (c = –0.321, with a t-statistic of –2.86). The IV estimates, where we instrument for 
$(10) $(10)
1/4 () tt F O M C ff    and 
$(10) $(10)
1/4 () t t NONFOMC ff     with 
$(2) $(2)
1/4 () tt F O M C yy    and 
$(2) $(2)
1/4 () t t NONFOMC yy    
respectively, also result in a larger coefficient for the FOMC-days piece than the non-FOMC-
days piece. Although the statistical significance of the FOMC-days piece is marginal, the point 
estimates suggest that movements in forward rates on FOMC days contain just as much—and 
perhaps even slightly more—discount rate news as those on non-FOMC days. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the real analogs to equations (7) and (8) for the 1999-present 
period. Reassuringly, we obtain similar point estimates using the TIPS data over this shorter 
sample period.
15 For example, the coefficient on the change in the real forward rate on FOMC 
announcement days from the OLS regression in column (5) is –0.567 (t = –2.05), as compared to 
a value of –0.564 in the nominal data using data back to 1987. 
Of course, whether the sample period is 1987-present or 1999-present, any attempt to 
forecast annual bond returns with a relatively small number of independent observations should 
                                                 
15 One wrinkle is that we do not observe the short-term real rate, which is needed to compute the forward rate spread 
for long-term real bonds. Following Pflueger and Viceira (2011), we estimate the short-term real rate as the fitted 
value from a regression of the realized real bill return on a number of covariates. 16 
 
be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. At the same time, it is important to be clear on the 
competing theories that are at play in this case and how they might shape one’s priors. Often 
when one is trying to predict asset returns, the null of no predictability has a strong ex ante 
theoretical standing, and so it may make sense to set a high bar for rejecting the null. But in this 
case, recall that a null of no predictability is equivalent to the proposition that monetary policy 
shocks have a powerful effect on expected real rates 10 years into the future—in other words, 
that monetary policy is non-neutral over very long horizons. For somebody who finds such a 
proposition hard to swallow, our forecasting results offer an alternative interpretation that may be 
more palatable, even if the statistical significance of these results is not overwhelming. 
B.  Impulse Response Functions 
Another way to illustrate the mean reversion of forward rates is to examine their impulse 
response to an initial shock to short rates. To do this, we again work with daily data and the 10-
year instantaneous forward rate. We begin by separately estimating 
$(10) $(10) $(2) $(2) $(10)
1$ $ 1 1 () ()( , ) tk t t t tk ffa k b k y y           (9) 
for k = 1, …, 250 using all days in the sample. That is, we regress the cumulative change in 10-
year nominal forwards from day t-1 to day t+k on the change in short-term nominal rates from t-
1 to t+1. These 250 regressions differ only in terms of the left-hand-side variable, namely the 
horizon over which we compute the cumulative subsequent change in 10-year forwards.  
Panel A of Figure 3 plots the coefficient b$(k) from estimating equation (9) on all days 
(i.e., FOMC and non-FOMC) from 1987-present.
16 The graph shows that a 100 bps shock to 
short-term nominal rates generates a 51 bps impulse to 10-year nominal forwards upon impact—
i.e., for k = 1. This effect is then gradually reverted away over the following 9 months, consistent 
with the idea that the initial response reflects a change in the term premium as opposed to news 
about short rates. Panel B repeats the same exercise, restricting attention to only FOMC dates. 
                                                 
16 Confidence intervals are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors to properly account for the overlapping 
nature of the dependent variable in regression (9). 17 
 
Consistent with our prior findings, the picture suggests that an FOMC-day impulse to forward 
rates dissipates especially rapidly. However, as shown by the wide confidence intervals in Panel 
B, the standard errors increase by a factor of three or four when we focus on just FOMC days, so 
any inferences about the exact timing of the mean reversion are necessarily tentative in this case. 
We next turn to the TIPS data from 1999-present and estimate 
(10) (10) $(2) $(2) (10)
11 1 () ()( . )
TIPS TIPS TIPS
t k t TIPS TIPS t t t k ffa k b k y y           (10) 
Panel C plots the coefficient bTIPS(k) from estimating equation (10) on all days from 1999-
present. The results in Panel C show that, averaging across all days, a 100 bps shock to nominal 
short rates is associated with a 27 bps increase in the 10-year real forward upon impact, which 
gradually dissipates over the following 9 months. Finally, Panel D does the same thing, but 
focusing only on FOMC dates. The initial impulse upon impact is 42 bps—by construction, the 
same as our baseline estimate from Table 2. As in Panel B, the point estimates make it appear 
that this effect is largely reverted away in just a few months, but again, the large standard errors 
associated with restricting attention to just FOMC days preclude precise inferences.  
In summary, both the forecasting regressions and the impulse response functions suggest 
that the response of distant real forwards to nominal short rates reflects variation in term premia 
as opposed to news about short-term real rates far into the future. Moreover, it looks like these 
changes in term premia are relatively short-lived, with most of the mean reversion in forward 
rates occurring within a one-year horizon. 
 
IV.  Why Does Monetary Policy Move Real Term Premia? 
Let us review the narrative to this point. We began by documenting that monetary policy 
shocks are associated with large changes in distant real forward rates, and by arguing that this 
association is likely to be causal in nature. Next, we showed that these changes in distant forward 
rates appear to reflect variation in term premia as opposed to changes in expected future short 18 
 
rates. This leaves us with a fundamental question: what is the economic mechanism by which 
innovations to monetary policy influence real term premia? 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of stories that one can tell. The first appeals to the 
standard consumption-based asset-pricing model in which the real term premium is pinned down 
by the covariance between real bond returns and the marginal utility of the representative 
investor. We discuss this theory below and argue that it is unlikely to explain our results. 
An alternative class of models is one in which markets are partially segmented, and term 
premia are determined by supply-and-demand effects. This is how most observers have thought 
about the effects of the Fed’s quantitative-easing policies, for example. These models are 
somewhat institutional by nature, so one can imagine many variations on the basic theme. For 
concreteness, we develop a particular supply-and-demand story based on a set of investors who 
care about the current yield on their portfolios. When short-term rates are low, these investors 
reach for yield by purchasing long-term bonds, which pushes down long-term real forward rates 
and lowers the term premium. We then provide some evidence that is consistent with the 
existence of this reaching-for-yield channel. 
A. Real Term Premia in a Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Model 
According to the standard consumption-based asset pricing model, the expected excess 
return on long-term real bonds at time t is given by 
,1 1 1
,1 , ,1 1 ,1
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  (11) 
where the real stochastic discount factor (SDF), Mt+1, depends on the marginal utility of a 
diversified representative investor. In light of equation (11), there are three ways to explain the 
finding that the real term premium falls when the Fed eases. 
First, it is possible that unexpected shifts in monetary policy could affect the volatility of 
bond returns t[RL,t+1]. However, to explain our results using this mechanism, one would further 
need to argue that a surprise easing meaningfully lowers conditional volatility whereas a surprise 19 
 
tightening raises conditional volatility. Such an asymmetry seems difficult to motivate a priori 
and there is little evidence for it in the data.
17 
Second, shifts in monetary policy could impact Corrt[RL,t+1,–Mt+1]. On the nominal side, 
Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2012) argue that the correlation between inflation and the real 
SDF may vary over time, so this term could play a role in explaining time-variation in the 
inflation risk premium. It is less clear why the correlation between real bond returns and the real 
SDF would vary and, particularly, why it would vary meaningfully at high frequencies in 
response to FOMC announcements. 
Finally, consider explanations that involve changes in t[Mt+1]—the mechanism that 
generates time-varying risk premia in most modern consumption-based models. These models, 
including habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), long-run risks (Bansal and Yaron 
(2004)), or time-varying disaster risk (Gabaix (2011)), share a common reduced form: t[Mt+1] is 
high during bad economic times and low during good times. However, in order for them to be 
relevant for our purposes, one would have to believe that changes in the stance of monetary 
policy actively cause—rather than simply respond to—changes in things like long-run disaster 
probabilities. This seems like something of a stretch. 
B. A Supply-and-Demand Model with Yield-Oriented Investors 
An alternative explanation for why monetary policy can move term premia is based on 
supply-and-demand effects that operate in partially segmented bond markets. We illustrate this 
point with a simple model featuring a set of investors who care about the current yield on their 
portfolios. The key assumptions of the model are as follows. There are two dates, 1 and 2. The 
real log short rate at time 1, r1, is set by the central bank. The real log short rate at time 2, r2, is 
initially uncertain. Moreover, monetary policy is assumed to be neutral in the long run. Thus, 
both E[r2] and Var[r2] are outside of the time-1 control of the central bank and should be thought 
                                                 
17 For instance, Lee (2002) estimates GARCH models which enable him to separately estimate the impact of a 
surprise FOMC easing versus a surprise tightening on conditional interest rate volatility. While a surprise tightening 
has a larger impact on interest rate volatility than a surprise easing, the evidence suggests that both positive and 
negative surprises raise conditional volatility. 20 
 
of as pinned down by long-run macroeconomic fundamentals. The only endogenous variable is 
y2, the time-1 log yield on real long-term (i.e., 2-period) bonds, and our interest is in seeing how 
y2 varies with the stance of monetary policy as summarized by r1. 
A fraction  of investors are “yield-oriented” with non-standard preferences described 
below, while a fraction (1 – )  are “expected-return-oriented” with conventional mean-variance 
preferences. Both investor types have unit risk tolerance. 
Expected-return-oriented investors have zero initial wealth and construct long-short 
positions to maximize E[wR] – Var[wR]/2, where wR is their future wealth. If they purchase bR 
units of long-term bonds and finance this position by rolling over short-term borrowing, their 
future wealth is  212 (2 ) RR wb yr r   .
18 Thus, expected-return-oriented investors solve 
 
2
21 2 2 max (2 [ ]) [ ]/ 2 ,
R bR R by r E rb V a r r      (12) 
and their demand for long-term bonds is 
1
22 2 1 2 ( ) ( [ ]) (2 [ ]). R by V a r r y rE r
    (13) 
By contrast, yield-oriented investors pick their holdings of long-term bonds bY, to solve 
 
2
21 2 max (2 2 ) [ ]/ 2 .
bY YY byr b V a r r     (14) 
The only difference between equations (14) and (12) is that in (14) we have replaced E[r2] in the 
first term with r1. The interpretation is that yield-oriented investors care about the spread in 
current yield between long- and short-term bonds (as captured by  21 22 yr  ), as opposed to the 
spread in expected returns (as captured by  21 2 2[ ] yrE r   ). Said differently, if the yield curve is 
upward sloping simply because E[r2] exceeds r1, this will make long-term bonds more attractive 
to the yield-oriented investors, but not to the expected-return-oriented investors. Thus, the 
demand for long-term bonds from yield-oriented investors depends on the difference in current 
income from owning long- versus short-term bond 
                                                 
18 We work with log returns to facilitate the exposition. This can be viewed as a linear approximation to a model 
based on simple returns. 21 
 
1
22 2 1 ()( [ ] ) ( 2 2 ) . Y by V a r r y r
   (15) 
We assume there is a fixed supply Q of long-term real bonds. The market clearing 
condition for long-term bonds is 
**
22 ()( 1 ) () YR Qb y b y      which implies that the 
equilibrium long-term forward rate is 

Forward rate Expected short rate Term premium
*
21 2 2 2 1  2[ ] [ ] ( [ ] ) . yr E r Q V a r r E rr     
 
 (16) 
Similarly, the expected excess return on long-term bonds is 
"Traditional" term premium "Reaching-for-yield" term premium
*
22 1 2 2 1 2[ ] [ ] ( [ ] ) . yE rr Q V a r r E rr     
  
 (17) 
Equations (16) and (17) show that the term premium has two components. There is a traditional 
component,  2 [] QV a rr  , that depends on bond supply and fundamental uncertainty, and a 
reaching-for-yield component,  21 ([] ) Er r   , that depends on the fraction of yield-oriented 
investors and the level of short-term interest rates. 
The reaching-for-yield term in (16) and (17) is what enables the model to rationalize our 
prior findings, namely that an easing of monetary policy is associated with a decline in distant 
real forwards and a decline in the real term premium. When the central bank cuts the short rate, 
21 [] Er r   rises and the term premium falls. Intuitively, this is because yield-oriented investors are 
hungrier for current income when  1 r  is low. As a result, they are willing to take on more duration 
risk by purchasing higher-yielding long-term bonds. And due to the limited risk tolerance of 
investors on the other side of the trade, this shift in demand lowers the term premium on these 
long-term bonds. Note that this explanation draws no distinction between movements in rates on 
FOMC versus non-FOMC days—it doesn’t matter whether rates move due to news about the 
Fed’s reaction function or news about macroeconomic fundamentals. Yield-oriented investors 
care about the differential carry from holding long-term bonds irrespective of its root cause. 22 
 
Why, according to this view, would one expect this lower term premia to accrue largely 
over the following 12 months? There are a few possibilities. A first is that a decline in short rates 
only temporarily boosts demand for long-term Treasuries from yield-oriented investors. Perhaps 
some yield-oriented investors initially respond to a drop in short rates by taking on more duration 
risk, but over time they instead shift towards taking on more credit risk. Alternatively, if 
arbitrage capital moves slowly in response to changes in risk-adjusted returns, the demand shock 
from yield-oriented investors may be met with increased arbitrageur capital over time. Or, 
following Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010), the increased demand for long-term bonds may 
be gradually accommodated by non-financial firms who adjust their debt maturity in response to 
shifts in investor demand. We attempt to shed some light on these issues below. 
D. Evidence on the Behavior of Yield-Oriented Investors 
  In addition to rationalizing the movements in real forward rates and term premia 
documented in Sections II and III, the model offers an additional set of predictions. Specifically, 
if we can identify a priori those investors who are most prone to be yield-oriented, their holdings 
of long-term bonds should be increasing in the yield spread. This follows immediately from 
equation (15), which says that the demand of yield-oriented investors is a function of  21 () y r  . 
  Of course, the holdings of the investing public as a whole must equal the fixed supply of 
long-term bonds, so there must be other investors (e.g., broker-dealers or hedge funds) who care 
less about current yield differentials and more about expected returns, and who take the other 
side of the trade. In what follows, we use commercial banks as a proxy for yield-oriented 
investors and primary dealers as a proxy for expected-return-oriented investors. As explained 
below, the logic of this split is based on existing accounting conventions, which arguably should 
have the effect of making banks more concerned with current yield than dealers.  
D.1. Commercial Banks 
We use quarterly Call Report data on the duration of commercial bank security portfolios 
to test the hypothesis that banks act like the yield-oriented investors in our model. Several factors 23 
 
suggest that commercial banks may be prone to behave in a yield-oriented fashion. First, the vast 
majority of commercial banks (weighted by market value) are publicly traded, so bank managers 
with short horizons may be tempted to take actions that boost current reported earnings at the 
expense of longer-term earnings (see e.g., Stein (1989)). Second, due to GAAP accounting 
conventions, a bank can typically boost near-term accounting earnings simply by replacing low-
yielding securities in its non-trading accounts with higher-yielding securities.
19 This is because 
interest income on non-trading-account securities flows through the income statement, but 
unrealized gains and losses on such securities do not flow through net income. Thus, a desire to 
boost current reported profits could lead bank managers to invest more aggressively in long-term 
securities when the yield curve is steep. Finally, because GAAP earnings also drive changes in 
regulatory capital, a bank may be able to boost its capital ratios and generate regulatory slack in 
the near-term by engaging in a larger carry-trade when the curve is steep. 
  Given the coarse disclosure available in the Call reports, we focus on a crude measure of 
securities portfolio duration: the aggregate fraction of non-trading-account securities with a 
current remaining maturity (for fixed-rate securities) or next re-pricing date (for floating-rate 
securities) of one year or longer: (SECLT/SEC). This measure is available beginning in 1988. 
Using quarterly data, we estimate specifications of the form 
$(10) $(1) (/ ) ( ) , LTt t t t SEC SEC a b y y u         (18) 
where (y
$(10) – y
$(1)) is the yield spread, measured as the difference in current yield between 10- 
and 1-year nominal Treasuries. A finding that b > 0 would suggest that banks reach for yield, 
buying more long-term bonds when the yield curve steepens. 
                                                 
19 Almost all non-trading-account securities are treated as “available-for-sale” under US GAAP. Although these 
securities are marked to market, unrealized gains/losses do not flow through the income statement (as do changes in 
the value of trading account securities). Instead, mark-to-market gains/losses flow through “other comprehensive 
income” and are accumulated on the balance sheet until realized. By contrast, interest income on these securities 
flows directly through the income statement. Thus, a bank can boost its near-term reported earnings by substituting 
high-yielding for low-yielding securities. A similar effect obtains for the small fraction of non-trading securities that 
are carried on the balance sheet on a historical cost basis (a.k.a., “held-to-maturity” securities). 24 
 
  Table 6 presents the results from this exercise. Column (1) shows that there is a strong 
positive relationship between (SECLT/SEC) and (y
$(10) – y
$(1)).
20 In terms of dollar magnitudes, 
the coefficient in column (1) suggests that a 100 basis-point decline in the short rate, holding 
fixed the long rate, leads to a 1.06 percentage-point increase in the share of bank securities that 
are long term. Bank securities have averaged roughly 18.5% of total bank assets since 1988. As 
of 2010:Q4, commercial bank assets were $11,728 billion, so this means that a 100-bp increase 
in the yield spread raises bank demand for long-term securities by $23 billion = 
1.06%×18.5%×$11,728. So a 300-bp swing in the yield spread—roughly the range over a full 
easing cycle—would boost demand by $69 billion. Of course, the less-than-1-year versus longer-
than-1-year margin is potentially only part of the overall portfolio adjustment process—banks 
might also be extending their duration within the longer-than-1-year bucket—and banks are just 
one set of investors who may care about current income. Thus, the results in Table 6 suggest that 
the induced shift in total demand from all yield-oriented investors could be quite substantial. 
The remaining columns of Table 6 test another implication of the reaching-for-yield 
story. Specifically, if reaching for yield is partially driven by a desire to manage reported 
earnings, then this tendency should be more pronounced for publicly-traded banks than for 
privately-held banks. Of course, if reaching for yield is driven solely by a desire to boost capital 
ratios and maintain regulatory slack, then one would not expect to see much of a difference 
between public and private banks. To investigate this issue, we construct two versions of 
SECLT/SEC, one for public banks and another for private banks.
21 As shown in column (2), the 
results for public banks are similar to those for all banks. This true almost by construction since a 
large majority of aggregate commercial banking assets are held by public banks. Consistent with 
                                                 
20 We have also tried regressing (SECLT/SEC) on both and y
$(10) and y
$(1) separately. The coefficient on y
$(10) is 
positive and significant, while the coefficient on y
$(1) is negative and significant. And the absolute magnitudes of 
the two coefficients are similar, consistent with the logic of equation (15). 
 
21 We classify a commercial bank as publicly traded if its parent Bank Holding Company has a valid CRSP link in 
the linking table maintained by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (see 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html). 25 
 
the earnings-management hypothesis, column (3) shows that yield-chasing behavior is less 
pronounced amongst private banks. The coefficient of 0.674 on (y
$(10) – y
$(1)) for private banks 
in column (3) is only half of the corresponding coefficient for public banks in column (2). 
However, as shown in column (4), we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for public 
banks is the same that for private banks. Thus, the split between public and private banks goes in 
the direction predicted by the earnings-management story, but the evidence on this front is 
statistically weak. Moreover, the positive, albeit only marginally significant, coefficient for 
private banks suggests that a desire to maintain regulatory slack might also play some role. 
Another question has to do with the persistence of the shifts in banks’ demands for long-
term bonds. We find some tentative evidence (not reported) suggesting that these demand shocks 
are gradually reversed over roughly the following 8 quarters. One way to see this is to add lagged 
values of (y
$(10) – y
$(1)) to equation (18) and then examine the cumulative sum of coefficients on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in the yield spread. 
D.2. Primary Dealers 
Next we examine the Treasury holdings of primary dealers. We think of primary dealers 
as a natural proxy for the expected-return-oriented investors in our model, the arbitrageurs who 
accommodate demand shocks coming from yield-oriented investors. Importantly, primary dealer 
activities are either housed within broker-dealers or in commercial bank trading departments. As 
a result, unlike banks’ non-trading accounts, primary dealers operate entirely on mark-to-market 
accounting. So even if they wanted to manage their earnings, playing the term spread would be 
less of a sure thing for them. 
We work with data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the aggregate 
holdings of primary dealers. A key advantage of this data is that we have high frequency 
observations of dealer holdings by maturity. Specifically, each week from July 2001-present, we 
have data on the aggregate net (long minus short) dealer holdings of Treasury bills (all of which 26 
 
mature in less than one year) and nominal coupon-bearing Treasuries broken into four buckets by 
remaining maturity: shorter than 3 years, 3 to 6 years, 6 to 11 years, and longer than 11 years.
22 
Measuring the net duration of primary dealer positions is a bit tricky since dealers can be 
net short Treasuries, both in a given maturity bucket as well as overall. To deal with this 
complication, we compute 
() (3 ) ( 3 6 ) ( 6 1 1 ) ( 1 1)
( )( 3 )( 3 6 )( 6 1 1 )( 1 1 )
0.5· 1.5· 4.5· 8.5· 14·
.
TB t m t m t m t m t
t
TB t m t m t m t m t
QQ Q Q Q
NETDUR
QQ Q Q Q
  
   
  

  
 (19) 
The numerator is proxy for the net dollar duration of dealers’ Treasury holdings. Then, to scale 
this variable, we divide it by the sum of the absolute positions in each maturity bucket. Thus, the 
scaled variable is like() / ( )
LONG SHORT
tt t t t t DUR LONG DUR SHORT LONG SHORT    .
23 
Obviously, a variety of factors besides those in our model might impact the duration of 
dealers’ Treasury holdings. In an attempt to control for some of these, we include proxies for the 
weekly change in the scale of dealers’ net positions in Treasuries, as well as the change in their 
net positions across all other reportable fixed income asset classes. A related concern is that 
high-frequency variation in the maturity structure of dealer positions may be driven by seasonal 
patterns of Treasury issuance—e.g., due to seasonal fluctuations in T-bill supply or the large 
offerings of longer-term notes and bonds in February, May, August, and November. To deal with 
this, we include a full set of week-of-year dummies in order to soak up any seasonal fluctuations 
in Treasury supply.  
Using weekly data, we then estimate specifications of the form 
$(10) $(1) (). tt t t t NETDUR a b y y u          cx  (20) 
                                                 
22 While primary dealers also report their holdings of TIPS, these are not broken out by maturity and so we do not 
use them to compute our measure of the maturity structure of dealers’ holdings. However, dealers’ holdings of TIPS 
are small relative to their overall Treasury holdings, so this choice has little impact on the resulting measure. 
 
23 Alternate approaches are to work directly with the numerator of NETDURt or to scale the numerator by the 
amount of outstanding Treasuries. These approaches are less desirable because the resulting measures are impacted 
by variation in the scale of brokers’ holdings relative to market as a whole and, thus, are no longer pure maturity 
measures. Nevertheless, we have experimented with these constructions and generally obtain similar results. 27 
 
If dealers function as the expected-return oriented investors in our model, we would expect to 
find b < 0. Table 7 presents the results from this exercise. Column (1) shows that there is a strong 
negative relationship between DURt and (y
$(10) – y
$(1)). Column (2) adds the various 
controls, including the week-of-year dummies. While the controls substantially increase the 
overall explanatory power of the regression, they have little impact on the coefficient of interest.  
Columns (3) and (4) repeat these exercises using a more comprehensive duration measure based 
on dealers’ holdings of both Treasuries and Agency debentures, since the latter are seen as a 
close substitute for Treasuries by many investors. This yields broadly similar conclusions. 
  Finally, we examine the dynamics of NETDURt following a shock to the yield spread. 
Specifically, we separately estimate 
$(10) $(1) $(10) $(1)
11 1 () ()[ ( ( )) ] , tt tt t k t tk NETDUR NETDUR a k b k y y y y             (21) 
 for k = 0, 1, …, 52. Thus, as above, these regressions differ solely in terms of the differencing 
horizon on the left-hand-side (the estimate for k = 0 corresponds to the estimates in column (1) of 
Table 7). Figure 4 plots the coefficients, b(k), versus horizon k. The point estimates suggest that 
the initial impulse to the duration of dealers’ Treasury holdings persists for roughly 5 months, 
but then largely vanishes within 9 months. Interestingly, this roughly matches the horizon over 
which the impulse from short-term nominal rates to distant real forwards is reverted away in 
Figure 3. One possible interpretation—in the spirit of Grossman and Miller (1988)—is that 
primary dealers function as front-line arbitrageurs in response to a demand shock, but over time, 
more arbitrage capital enters the market, allowing the dealers to unwind their positions and 
reversing the initial price impact. Of course, the wide confidence intervals in Figure 4 underscore 
that our estimates of the timing of dealers’ unwind are quite imprecise, so this interpretation is 
necessarily somewhat speculative. 
E.  Other Supply-and-Demand Channels 
Our theory of yield-oriented investors is one specific example of a supply-and-demand 
channel that connects monetary policy shocks to real term premia. However, one can tell other 28 
 
stories in a similar spirit. Hanson (2012) emphasizes time-variation in the aggregate supply of 
duration. Specifically, due to the negative convexity of mortgage-backed securities, the total 
quantity of duration risk that bond investors must bear increases when rates rise. If fixed-income 
markets are partially segmented from other asset markets, then this variation in aggregate 
duration could raise the term premium via a conditional-CAPM channel as in Vayanos and Vila 
(2009). The intuition is straightforward: if the supply of a given risk factor rises, the risk 
premium needs to rise in order to induce investors to hold the new supply. Hanson (2012) tests 
this alternative by using measures of aggregate fixed income duration to forecast bond returns.
24 
He finds that this duration-risk-premium channel appears to soak up some, but not all, of the 
explanatory power of recent changes in forward rates for future bond returns.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
Changes in the stance of monetary policy have a surprisingly strong impact on distant 
forward real interest rates. These movements in forward rates appear to reflect changes in term 
premia, which largely accrue over the next year, as opposed to varying expectations about future 
real rates. Moreover, our evidence suggests that the driving force behind time-varying term 
premia is the behavior of yield-oriented investors, who react to a cut in short rates by increasing 
their demand for longer-term bonds, thereby putting downward pressure on long-term rates. 
Our work raises, but does not answer, a series of questions about the ultimate economic 
importance of this monetary transmission channel. In particular, suppose that a monetary easing 
lowers long-term real rates through the mechanism we have described. What might the resulting 
impact on corporate investment be? On the one hand, the fact that the effect of monetary policy 
on long-term real rates is transitory (i.e., it is reversed after about a year) might seem to imply 
                                                 
24 One might ask why, according to this theory, the current shape of the yield curve is not a sufficient statistic for 
forecasting excess bond returns. Greenwood and Vayanos (2010a) provide an explanation: the yield curve contains 
information about both the expected path of future short rates and term premia, both of which vary over time. 
Measures of the quantity of aggregate duration pertain solely to the latter and, thus, can improve the forecasting 
power of regressions that include only the yield spread. 29 
 
that it would matter less for corporate capital budgeting decisions. On the other hand, some firms 
may view the temporarily lower long-term rates as a market-timing opportunity, i.e., a window 
during which it is particularly attractive to issue long-term debt. This in turn could serve to 
stimulate their investment.
25 
While we have focused narrowly on term premia in the Treasury market, the idea that 
monetary policy can influence bond-market risk premia has potentially broader implications.  
Indeed, much recent work has been motivated by the hypothesis that accommodative monetary 
policy can reduce credit-risk premia.
26 It seems like a promising avenue for future work would 
be to study these two channels of monetary transmission in a unified setting. For example, in the 
context of our model, one could allow yield-oriented investors to choose among not only short-
term and long-term Treasuries, but defaultable credit instruments (corporate loans,  mortgages, 
etc.) as well. This would presumably yield a set of predictions about the co-movement of term 
premia and credit-risk premia in response to changes in monetary policy, and could be the basis 
for a wider-ranging and more integrated empirical investigation of these phenomena. 
                                                 
25 Similar issues arise when a firm makes investment and financing decisions in the face of a transitory equity 
mispricing. Stein (1996) and Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) argue that the investment of financially-constrained 
firms is most sensitive to equity mispricing. One might conjecture that the same would be true here: constrained 
firms may be most likely to adjust investment in response to policy-induced changes in term premia. At the same 
time, the financing (i.e., debt maturity) decisions of unconstrained firms may adjust more as in Greenwood, Hanson, 
and Stein (2010). However, unlike constrained firms, this would not have a large impact on their investment. 
 
26 See, e.g., Rajan (2005), Borio and Zhu (2008), Greenwood and Hanson (2012), Jiménez et al (2011), Adrian and 
Shin (2010) and Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2011). 30 
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Figure 1: Response of US forwards to monetary policy news on FOMC days. Panel A plots the 
coefficient  b$(n) from estimating equation (4a) on FOMC announcement dates from 1999 through 
February 2012 (which refer to as the “present” throughout the paper) 
$( ) $(2) $( )
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Panel B plots the coefficients bTIPS(n) and b(n) from estimating equations (4b) and (4c) on FOMC 
announcement dates from 1999-present 
() $ ( 2 ) () () $ ( 2 ) () () ()   a n d     () () .
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Confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are shown as dashed lines. We exclude five FOMC 
announcements dates from 2009 to 2011 when there was significant news about the Federal Reserve’s 
Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs. 
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Panel B: Response of real and break-even inflations forwards by maturity 
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Figure 2:  Response of UK forwards to monetary policy news on BOE days. Panel A plots the 
coefficient b$(n) from estimating equation (4a) on BOE MPC announcement dates from 1999-present 
$( ) $(2) $( )
$$ () () .
nn
tt t fa n b n y       
Panel B plots the coefficients bTIPS(n) and b(n) from estimating equations (4b) and (4c) on BOE MPC 
announcement dates from 1999-present 
() $ ( 2 ) () () $ ( 2 ) () () ()   a n d     () () .
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               
Confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are shown as dashed lines. We exclude six MPC 
announcements dates when there was significant news about the BOE’s quantitative easing operations 
which involved purchases of long-dated Gilts. 
 
Panel A: Response of nominal forwards by maturity 
 
Panel B: Response of real and break-even inflations forwards by maturity 
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Figure 3: Impulse response of 10-year US forwards to short-term nominal rates. Panel A plots the coefficient b$(k) from estimating equation 
(9) using all days from 1987-present 
$(10) $(10) $(2) $(2) $(10)
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for horizons k = 1, …, 250 days. Panel B plots repeats the same exercise, restricting attention to only FOMC dates from 1987-present. Panel C 
plots the coefficient bTIPS(k) from estimating equation (10) on all days from 1999-present 
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Panel D plots repeats this exercise, restricting attention to only FOMC dates from 1999-present. Confidence intervals, based on Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors to account for the overlapping nature of the variables, are shown as dashed lines. In Panels A and C we allow for serial 
correlation at up to 1.5 × k lags (to the nearest integer). In Panels B and D, we allow for serial correlation between FOMC meetings at up to  
1.5 × (k / 25) lags, since FOMC meetings occur roughly every 25 business days on average. 
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Figure 4: Impulse response of primary dealer NETDUR to the yield spread. The figure plots the 
coefficient b(k) from estimating the following regressions using weekly data from July 2001- present 
$(10) $(1) $(10) $(1)
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for horizons k = 0, 1, …, 52 weeks. Confidence intervals, based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors to 
account for the overlapping nature of the variables, are shown as dashed lines. Specifically, we allow for 
serial correlation at up to 1.5 × k lags (to the nearest integer). 
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Table 1: Response of US Treasury forward rates to monetary policy news. Regressions of changes in 
nominal, real, and breakeven inflation instantaneous forward rates (X = $, TIPS, and ) on changes in the 
2-year nominal yield on FOMC announcement days from 1999 through February 2012 (which refer to as 
the “present” throughout the paper) 
() $ ( 2 ) () () () .
Xn Xn
tX Xtt fa n b n y       
We estimate these regressions for maturities of n = 5, …, 20. For an announcement on day t, we compute 
the 2-day change from t-1 to t+1. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. We 
exclude five FOMC announcements dates from 2009 to 2011 when there was significant news about the 
Federal Reserve’s Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs. Daily estimates of nominal forward 
rates, real forward rates, and breakeven-inflation forward rates are based on Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright 
(2007 and 2010). The data, updated regularly by Federal Reserve Board staff, is available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html and 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200805/200805abs.html . 
 
n  b$(n)  [t]          R
2  bTIPS(n) [t]         R
2  b(n)  [t]          R
2 
       
5  0.843  [6.07]     0.30  0.653 [5.98]    0.24  0.190  [2.46]     0.05 
6  0.729  [4.90]     0.21  0.563 [5.77]    0.20  0.166  [1.80]     0.04 
7  0.634  [4.22]     0.16  0.505 [5.58]    0.18  0.129  [1.22]     0.02 
8  0.557  [3.84]     0.13  0.467 [5.24]    0.17  0.090  [0.80]     0.01 
9  0.496  [3.64]     0.11  0.441 [4.88]    0.17  0.055  [0.48]     0.00 
10  0.446  [3.54]     0.09  0.421 [4.63]    0.18  0.025  [0.23]     0.00 
11  0.405  [3.47]     0.09  0.405 [4.47]    0.18  0.001  [0.01]     0.00 
12  0.371  [3.37]     0.08  0.390 [4.37]    0.18  -0.018  [-0.18]     0.00 
13  0.342  [3.21]     0.07  0.376 [4.29]    0.17  -0.034  [-0.35]     0.00 
14  0.315  [2.99]     0.07  0.362 [4.21]    0.17  -0.047  [-0.48]     0.00 
15  0.291  [2.73]     0.06  0.350 [4.10]    0.15  -0.059  [-0.58]     0.00 
16  0.267  [2.45]     0.06  0.338 [3.95]    0.14  -0.071  [-0.65]     0.01 
17  0.244  [2.17]     0.05  0.327 [3.76]    0.13  -0.083  [-0.70]     0.01 
18  0.222  [1.89]     0.04  0.316 [3.56]    0.12  -0.094  [-0.74]     0.01 
19  0.199  [1.62]     0.04  0.306 [3.36]    0.11  -0.107  [-0.77]     0.01 
20  0.176  [1.36]     0.03  0.296 [3.15]    0.09  -0.120  [-0.79]     0.01 38 
 
Table 2: Robustness checks for US. Regressions of changes in nominal, real, and breakeven inflation instantaneous forward rates (X = $, TIPS, 
and ) on changes in various short rates on FOMC announcement days 
() () () () .
Xn Xn
tX X t t fa n b n M P        
t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. We first vary the window (1-day versus 2-day changes) used to compute 
changes in long-term forwards and short-term rates. We next use a variety of different proxies for monetary policy news on FOMC announcement 
dates, including the “future path of policy” news factor as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005b). Finally, we vary the sample. Data on Fed 
Funds futures, Eurodollar futures and Overnight Index Swap rates is from Bloomberg. 
 
  # Obs.  b$(10) [t]          R
2  bTIPS(10) [t]          R
2  b(10)  [t]          R
2 
 
       
Baseline:                 
2-year UST  107 0.446 [3.54]     0.09  0.421 [4.63]     0.18  0.025 [0.23]     0.00 
                 
Vary proxy for MP news:                 
2-year UST, 1-day change  107 0.245 [2.98]     0.08  0.215 [2.90]     0.13  0.021 [0.30]     0.00 
1-year UST  107  0.186  [1.30]     0.01  0.287 [2.60]     0.07  -0.100 [-0.89]     0.01 
1-year UST, 1-year forward  107  0.505  [5.13]     0.17  0.408 [5.42]     0.24  0.097 [1.14]     0.02 
3-quarter forward Eurodollar  107  0.239  [2.39]     0.07  0.286 [4.43]     0.20  -0.046 [-0.66]     0.01 
6-quarter forward Eurodollar  107  0.398  [4.23]     0.23  0.326 [6.33]     0.33  0.072 [0.95]     0.02 
9-month forward Fed funds  89  0.258  [1.85]     0.03  0.354 [3.72]     0.11  -0.096 [-0.82]     0.01 
12-month forward Fed funds  74  0.308  [1.90]     0.04  0.401 [3.42]     0.14  -0.093 [-0.75]     0.01 
1-year OIS  81  0.172  [0.84]     0.01  0.334 [2.15]     0.07  -0.162 [-1.07]     0.02 
2-year OIS  80  0.571  [3.53]     0.12  0.595 [5.24]     0.25  -0.024 [-0.19]     0.00 
1-year OIS, 1-year forward  80  0.570  [5.48]     0.21  0.517 [7.32]     0.33  0.052 [0.60]     0.01 
GSS (2005b) “path” factor  107  0.274  [2.43]     0.10  0.279 [3.75]     0.23  -0.005 [-0.07]     0.00 
                 
Vary sample                 
Add 5 QE dates  112 0.504 [3.30]     0.10  0.455 [4.97]     0.18  0.049 [0.40]     0.00 
Regular meeting  100 0.452 [4.16]     0.09  0.383 [4.04]     0.14  0.069 [0.73]     0.01 
Unscheduled meeting  7 0.565 [2.62]     0.38  0.668 [3.66]     0.67  -0.103 [-0.38]     0.02 
Add minutes dates  212 0.528 [5.85]     0.17  0.312 [4.76]     0.14  0.203 [2.04]     0.04 39 
 
Table 3: Response of UK gilt forward rates to monetary policy news. Regressions of changes in 
nominal, real, and breakeven inflation instantaneous forward rates (X = $, TIPS, and ) on changes in the 
2-year nominal gilt yield on MPC announcement days from 1999-present 
() $ ( 2 ) () () () .
Xn Xn
tX Xtt fa n b n y       
We estimate these regressions for maturities of n = 5, …, 20. For an MPC announcement on day t, we 
compute the 2-day change from t-1 to t+1. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in 
brackets. We exclude six MPC announcements dates when there was significant news about the BOE’s 
quantitative easing operations which involved purchases of long-dated Gilts. The UK yield curve data is 
based on the methodology described in Andersen and Sleath (1999). The data is available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/yieldcurve/default.aspx. 
 
n  b$(n)  [t]          R
2  bTIPS(n) [t]         R
2  b(n)  [t]          R
2 
       
5  0.636  [7.22]     0.35  0.499 [7.45]    0.37 0.137  [2.14]     0.04
6  0.562  [6.00]     0.27  0.441 [7.13]    0.34 0.120  [1.84]     0.03
7  0.504  [5.41]     0.23  0.394 [6.98]    0.32 0.110  [1.65]     0.02
8  0.459  [5.20]     0.20  0.354 [6.68]    0.29 0.104  [1.58]     0.02
9  0.420  [5.20]     0.19  0.320 [6.13]    0.26 0.100  [1.54]     0.02
10  0.384  [5.24]     0.18  0.291 [5.40]    0.22 0.093  [1.45]     0.02
11  0.351  [5.11]     0.17  0.266 [4.65]    0.18 0.085  [1.28]     0.02
12  0.319  [4.69]     0.14  0.244 [4.00]    0.15 0.075  [1.06]     0.01
13  0.292  [4.09]     0.11  0.226 [3.48]    0.12 0.065  [0.84]     0.01
14  0.268  [3.52]     0.09  0.211 [3.08]    0.10 0.057  [0.67]     0.01
15  0.250  [3.09]     0.07  0.199 [2.78]    0.09 0.051  [0.56]     0.00
16  0.236  [2.82]     0.06  0.190 [2.56]    0.08 0.047  [0.49]     0.00
17  0.228  [2.68]     0.06  0.183 [2.41]    0.07 0.045  [0.47]     0.00
18  0.224  [2.67]     0.06  0.179 [2.32]    0.06 0.045  [0.47]     0.00
19  0.224  [2.75]     0.06  0.176 [2.26]    0.06 0.047  [0.52]     0.00
20  0.227  [2.92]     0.07  0.175 [2.24]    0.06 0.052  [0.59]     0.01
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Table 4: Response of US long-term forward rates to changes in short-term rates. Regressions of 
changes real instantaneous forward rates on changes in short-term nominal rates on all days, allowing for 
a differential response on FOMC announcement dates (excluding any QE dates) 
$(2) $(2) () () . tt
TIPS n Xn
tt t t t yy fa b c F O M C dF O M C             
We estimate these regressions for 5-, 10-, and 20-year forwards using daily data from 1999 through 
February 2012. Standard errors are based on Newey-West standard errors allowing for serial correlation 
at up to 2 lags. 
 
5-year 10-year 20-year
y
$(2)  0.493 0.268 0.240
  [15.90] [12.30] [9.32]
FOMC  -0.003 -0.005 -0.010
  [-0.26] [-0.58] [-1.20]
y
$(2) × FOMC  0.160 0.153 0.057
  [1.47] [1.69] [0.60]
Constant  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
[-0.61] [-0.38] [-0.23]
Observations  3,283 3,283 3,283
R
2  0.22 0.11 0.05
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Table 5: Mean reversion in forward rates. This table forecasts 12-month changes in forward rates using 
changes in forward rates over the past 3 months 
(9) (10) (10) (10) (10)
11 / 4 1 (),
XX X X X
tt t t t t fa b ff f           cx  
for X = $ and TIPS. The regressions are estimated with monthly data. To deal with the overlapping nature 
of the 12-month returns t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial 
correlation at up to 18 lags. We estimate these regressions with and without controlling for forward rate 
spread,      
              1  . The table shows OLS and IV estimates. In the IV specifications we 
instrument for (   
            / 
     ) using the change in nominal short rates over the past 3 months, (  
$     
    / 
$    ). We then decompose the change in 10-year forwards into components that occurred on FOMC 
days and on all other days: (   
            / 
     ) = (   
            / 
     )FOMC + (   
            / 
     )NONFOMC. In IV 
versions of these regressions, we instrument for (   
            / 
     )FOMC and (   
            / 
     )NONFOMC with 
(  
$          / 
$    )FOMC and (  
$          / 
$    )NONFOMC. Panel A shows nominal forecasting results from 1987-
present. Panel B shows real forecasting results from 1999-present. 
 
Panel A: Forecasting changes in nominal forward rates, 1987-present 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS  IV OLS  IV OLS  IV OLS  IV 
   
$            / 
$      -0.343  -1.078  -0.284  -1.228     
  [-3.21]  [-2.13]  [-2.47]  [-2.53]     
    
$            / 
$     
    
         -0.564 -1.369 -0.561 -1.774 
         [-1.69] [-0.79] [-1.64] [-1.17] 
    
$            / 
$     
       
         -0.321 -1.084 -0.256 -1.238 
         [-2.86] [-2.04] [-2.10] [-2.39] 
   
$         
$        -0.137 -0.112     -0.138 -0.112 
     [-3.15] [-2.12]     [-3.21] [-2.10] 
Constant -0.281  -0.304  0.054  -0.037 -0.283 -0.308  0.055 -0.042 
  [-2.76] [-2.59]  [0.37] [-0.19] [-2.78] [-2.61]  [0.37] [-0.21] 
Observations  289 289 289 289 289 289 289 289 
R
2  0.04   0.13   0.04   0.14   
 
Panel B: Forecasting changes in real forward rates, 1999-present 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV  OLS IV 
   
                / 
          -0.514  -0.728  -0.522  -0.811     
  [-3.99]  [-1.27]  [-5.21]  [-1.88]     
    
                / 
         
    
         -0.567 -1.081 -0.533 -0.590 
         [-2.05] [-1.75] [-2.03] [-1.11] 
    
                / 
         
       
         -0.498 -0.759 -0.519 -0.792 
         [-3.23] [-1.38] [-4.00] [-1.95] 
   
             
            -0.159 -0.159     -0.159 -0.160 
     [-3.75] [-3.75]     [-3.68] [-3.70] 
Constant  -0.228  -0.234 0.164 0.158  -0.229  -0.240 0.164 0.163 
  [-2.85]  [-2.70] [1.54] [1.44]  [-2.88]  [-2.70] [1.49] [1.39] 
Observations  142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
R
2  0.12   0.37   0.12   0.37  
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Table 6: Duration of commercial bank securities portfolios and the yield spread, 1988-2010. 
Regressions of quarterly changes in the aggregate duration of bank securities portfolios on quarterly 
changes in the yield spread 
$(10) $(1) (/ ) ( ) . LT t t t t SEC SEC a b y y u         
t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are shown in brackets. SECLT/SEC is the fraction of non-
trading account securities with a remaining maturity (for fixed rate securities) or next re-pricing date (for 
floating rate securities) of 1 year or more. Column (1) shows the result for all banks. Columns (2) and (3) 
show results for publicly-traded banks and for private banks, respectively. Finally, column (4) shows the 
difference between public and private banks. Thus, the t-statistics in column (4) enables one to test the 
hypothesis that the coefficients for public and private banks are equal. We classify a commercial bank as 
publicly traded if its parent Bank Holding Company has a valid CRSP link in the table maintained by 
researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This linking table is available online at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html. 
 
  All  
Banks 
Public  
Banks 
Private  
Banks 
Difference: 
Public – Private 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(y
($(10) – y
($(1))  1.060  1.229 0.674 0.555
  [3.76]  [3.07] [1.33] [0.75]
Constant  0.009  0.003 -0.009 0.012
  [0.08]  [0.02] [-0.07] [0.07]
Observations  91  91  91  91 
R-squared  0.13  0.11  0.04  0.01 
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Table 7: Duration of primary dealer Treasury holdings and the yield spread, 2001-present. 
Regressions of weekly changes in the aggregate duration primary dealer Treasury holdings on weekly 
changes in the yield spread 
$(10) $(1) () . tt t t NET a b y y u DUR         
NETDURt is defined in equation (19). The even numbered columns include controls for the weekly 
change in the scale of dealers’ net position in Treasuries and all other reportable fixed income asset 
classes as well as a full set of week-of-year dummies. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors, are 
shown in brackets. Columns (1) and (2) show this exercise for our baseline measure of the duration of 
dealers’ Treasury holdings. Columns (3) and (4) repeat this exercise using a more comprehensive duration 
measure based on dealers’ holdings of both Treasuries and Agency debentures. The primary dealer data is 
available on-line at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/gsds/search.cfm. 
 
Treasury Holdings  Treasury plus Agency Holdings 
(1) (2) (3)  (4)
(y
($(10) – y
($(1))  -0.973 -0.884 -0.451  -0.401
[-3.12] [-3.00] [-3.85]  [-3.53]
Constant  0.004 -0.355 0.002  -0.118
[0.12] [-0.94] [0.17]  [-0.84]
Controls  No Yes No  Yes
Observations  555 555 555  555
R-squared  0.03 0.15 0.04  0.20
 